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Hearsay

§ 8:91

Rule 803

§ 8:91 Public records—Forensic laboratory reports
Prosecutors routinely prove DNA profile and match reports
generated by laboratory tests, blood-alcohol test results, chemical
tests of suspected drugs, and many others. These depend on controlled procedures, and usually they involve experts who testify
at trial—chemists, doctors, and forensic analysts whose expertise
covers a variety of subjects. These experts regularly testify to the
results reached, and usually the results are also set out in writ- ten
reports.
How to handle such reports in criminal cases is a matter that
presents considerable challenge. The issue came to the fore in
2009 when the Court decided in Melendez-Diaz that drug
analyses, when generated by forensic laboratories operated by
the state, are “testimonial” in nature. As a constitutional matter
under the Crawford doctrine, it follows that proof of this nature
requires live testimony, and not just use of the reports
themselves.1 The same result should obtain where reports are
produced by private laboratories working in conjunction with law
enforcement agencies or prosecutors, as happened in the Williams case in 2012.2 It needs also to be borne in mind that satisfying constitutional concerns does not by itself resolve hearsay
issues: Lab reports, when offered to prove their conclusions, are
hearsay even when the prosecutor calls technicians as witnesses.
It seems useful to start by looking at the destination to which
the modern cases and (in the states) statutory developments
have led. Then it is useful to look in some detail at confrontation
issues that surfaced in Melendez-Diaz and later opinions, because
these issues largely eclipse hearsay issues that arise in applying
the public records exception. Finally, the discussion take up the
hearsay issues, and use of the public records exception in this
setting.
Where we have gotten to: Lab reports and live testimony. Forensic laboratory reports are not freely admissible against defendants
U.S. v. Johnson, 413 F.2d 1396, 1397–1398 (5th Cir. 1969) (agent's
testimony that motor number matched number that FBI's computerized center
listed as stolen was double hearsay).
Sixth Circuit: U.S. v. Davis, 568 F.2d 514, 515–516 (6th Cir. 1978) (error
to admit testimony by FBI agent who ran numbers through National Crime Information Center and made a “hit” when one matched vehicle reported stolen).
[Section 8:91]
1

Supreme Court: Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (discussed in
§ 8:27, supra); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
2
Supreme Court: See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S.Ct. 2221 (2012) (rejecting
challenge where expert testified on basis of private lab report, but not because
such the lab was private rather than state-owned).
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in criminal cases in the manner of ordinary hearsay that fits
conventional exceptions, such as the business records or state-ofmind exceptions. It is well understood that such reports are often
decisive and critical for prosecutors, and yet fallible and subject
to the separate concerns underlying the hearsay doctrine and the
confrontation clause. When DNA profiling shows “match” between defendant's genetic makeup and tissue samples found on
the person of the victim or at the crime scene, they are likely to
be decisive. The same is true when blood-alcohol tests show the
intoxication of a driver in a “drunk driving” case. Yet forensic
testing is subject to significant risks of error stemming from laboratory mistakes, limitations in technology, contamination of
samples, mislabeling or mixing samples up, interpretive difficulties, and (as the Court commented in Melendez-Diaz) incompetent
or dishonest analysts.3
Still, it is essential to find a way to make use of reports of forensic test results in criminal cases. One reason is that the
analyst who performs the tests is unlikely to remember in enough
detail the steps taken or the result reached in any given case, so
insisting on live testimonial accounts in lieu of reports would be
counterproductive. Even if the analyst refreshes recollection
before trial by reading the report, there are often details and
complexities in the steps taken and results reached that nobody
could remember, any more than one can remember all the charges
on a credit card or the checks written on a bank account over a
period of weeks or months. Insisting that lab test results be presented by live testimony would often result in an inferior and
incomplete presentation, with more errors than one would
encounter if the report itself were used.
There are also practical considerations. From the standpoint of
prosecutors, having to call the analyst as witness can be burden3

See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009) (citing
modern studies concluding that laboratory reports suffer from significant risks
of error based on bias or mistakes in procedure, and commenting that “lack of
proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in cross-examination”
and that confrontation is designed “to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst,
but the incompetent one as well”).
And see generally Imwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the
Foundation for the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human
Error as a Cause of Forensic Misanalysis, 69 Wash. U. L.Q. 19 (1991) (surveying studies showing significant margins of error in forensic analysis; still, most
lab reports are correct and burden of showing departures from standard protocol
should rest on opponent); Imwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing
Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against Criminal Defendants, 30 Hast. L. J.
621, 637 (1979) (studies uncover “real possibility of error” in forensic analyses
by police labs).
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some or impossible. Participants in the process may become unavailable, particularly if months or years have elapsed between
testing and trial. Even if they are available, requiring them to
testify is costly in taking them from their work as analysts. On the
other hand, from the standpoint of the defense, it may be
critical to have a live witness—critical because the only way to
deal effectively with errors or flawed outcomes is to be able to
cross-examine a witness who knows what was done and understands the technology and laboratory protocols.4 Yet sometimes
the opposite is true, and the analyst's testimony is not critical to
the defense at all: The defense may recognize that the report got
it right, and a defendant would prefer not to have a live witness
presenting the results, which is often fine with prosecutors as
well.
There is another practical complication, and it has absorbed
the energy of many lawyers and courts in recent years: Forensic
testing often involves activities by many persons, including those
who gather and package and mark crime scene samples, those
who check and calibrate the machinery used in the testing process, and those who actually perform the tests and sometimes
check (or “certify”) the results. Here is one common question that
arises: How many of these people can be said to be essential to a
full and fair presentation?
Many states have adopted, as the best approach to these
problems, “notice and demand” statutes. These vary widely, but
essentially they require the prosecutor to give notice of intent to
offer lab reports, and they allow the defendant to demand production of the relevant witnesses.5 Under this approach, the defense
is assured of a percipient witness who can be cross-examined,
while allowing the prosecutor not to go to the trouble of calling
such a witness where the defense is willing to forego such
questioning. The Supreme Court has approved such statutes as
4

Second Circuit: U.S. v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 64–65, 81–82 (2d Cir. 1977)
(noting questions and discrepancies in report; defense may wish to explore
questions unique to case and chemist's qualifications and experience; defense
might have tried to determine whether tests were properly performed,
procedures and analyses are reliable, and equipment was in good working
order).
5
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-30309(5) (crime lab reports “shall be
received in evidence,” provided that any party may request preparer to “testify
in person” by giving 10 days' notice); Ohio R.C. § 2925.51 (lab reports on drugs
are admissible unless defense demands testimony of analyst).

Hearsay

§ 8:91

Rule 803

constitutional.6 Some of these require defendants to advance some
reason for insisting on live testimony, which may be difficult or
impossible in some cases and may impose too heavy a burden to
comport with due process, although the Supreme Court has yet
to speak to this point. 7 Another common approach is the
“subpoena statute,” which invites defendants to subpoena the
analyst, but these statutes unfairly put on the defendant the
burden of calling the witness, and potentially the risk of being
left with nothing if the analyst cannot be found or brought to
court, and the Court has rightly condemned this approach.8 The
notice-and-demand statutes inspired the 2013 amendment to
Rule 803(10), which put in place a similar procedure in connection with the use of certificates to prove the absence of public
entries or records.9
Constitutional Issues: Melendez-Diaz; Bullcoming; Williams. In
three modern decisions, each by five-Justice majorities, the
Supreme Court dealt with confrontation issues in the use of lab
reports.
6

Supreme Court: Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 326 (2009)
(notice-and-demand statutes “shift no burden,” and can properly require the
matter to be raised before trial).
7
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. 2C:35-19 (forensic drug reports are admissible in
“unless it appears from [defendant's] notice of objection and specific grounds for
that objection that the composition, quality, or quantity of the substance submitted to the laboratory for analysis will be contested at trial”).
See Imwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation for
the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human Error as a
Cause of Forensic Misanalysis, 69 Wash. U. L.Q. 19, 43 (1991) (burden to show
untrustworthy test procedure should fall on opponent); Imwinkelried, The
Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against Criminal Defendants, 30 Hast. L. J. 621, 647 (1979) (court should exclude lab report
offered to prove essential element in crime on showing that “more likely than
not the conclusion expressed in the report is so evaluative that it could be the
subject of varying expert opinion”).
State v. Laturner, 218 P.3d 23, 30 (Kan. 2009) (notice-and-demand statute requiring defense to object to lab certificate and to claim that the results
will be contested at trial was unconstitutional; burden too heavy).
8
Supreme Court: Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009)
(confrontation clauses puts burden on prosecutor; letting defense subpoena
analyst “shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows” from state to
defense).
Ninth Circuit: Wigglesworth v. Oregon, 49 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 1995) (statute must require state to subpoena technician; letting defense do it is a Catch22, forcing defendant to “call the criminalist” and “possibly bolster” state's case,
“or forego examination” and maybe lose the chance “to expose a defect).
Oregon: State v. Willis, 236 P.3d 714 (Or. 2010) (letting defense subpoena
preparer of crime lab report does not satisfy confrontation concerns) (reversing).
9
See the discussion of Rule 803(10) in § 8:94, infra.
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The Melendez-Diaz case, decided in 2009, held that a forensic
lab report prepared by the Massachusetts state crime laboratory
was testimonial under Crawford. The report said the substance
seized from defendant was cocaine, and it was offered as proof
that indeed he was in possession of that substance. The majority
(in an opinion by Justice Scalia, who authored Crawford) firmly
rejected arguments that forensic lab reports qualify as business
records that escape the “testimonial” label, and just as firmly
rejected arguments that forcing prosecutors to call laboratory
technicians would be too burdensome. Equally important, the
majority cited modern studies concluding that laboratory reports
suffer from significant risks of error based on bias or mistakes in
procedure, and on lack of training or even dishonesty. And the
majority rejected suggestions that scientific evidence differed
from “accusatory” statements, and went out of its way to approve
notice-and-demand statutes and to reject “subpoena” statutes as
inadequate because they put the burden on defendants to summon lab technicians.10
The Bullcoming case came down in 2011, and it addressed the
question whether testimony presenting forensic lab results, given
by a colleague of the analyst who conducted the tests, could
satisfy confrontation rights. There the report rested on gas
chromatography, and it concluded that defendant had a blood
alcohol content of .21. The analyst who did the test and prepared
the report did not appear, and the prosecutor did not even claim
that he was unavailable (he was on unpaid leave for an undisclosed reason). Instead, the prosecutor called another analyst
from the same lab to answer questions, but he had not been
involved in running defendant's test. The state argued that the
report reflected machine output that could not be testimonial, but
the Court rejected this argument, stressing that the report also
said it was defendant's blood that was tested, that the analyst
adhered to protocol, and that no circumstances affected the integrity of the sample or validity of the analysis. These representations related “to past events and human actions not revealed in
raw, machine-produced data” and were “meet for crossexamination.” Producing the second analyst as a witness did not
satisfy the confrontation clause. Such “surrogate testimony” could
not convey what the testing analyst “knew or observed about the
events” that he certified, and would not “expose any lapses or lies
on the certifying analyst's part.”11
In the Williams case in 2012, the split that had been seen in
10
11

Supreme Court: Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
Supreme Court: Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011).
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Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming took a different shape, and the
Court approved expert testimony based on a forensic report that
was not itself introduced into evidence (different from, but
uncomfortably close to, the “surrogate testimony” condemned in
Bullcoming). In Williams the prosecutor adduced expert testimony by a state-employed scientist that rested in part on a lab
report prepared by Cellmark (a private lab), but not offering the
report itself. A four-Justice plurality invoked the principle that
experts can rely on inadmissible evidence, and Justice Thomas
concurred in the result on a narrow ground, while actually agreeing with four dissenting Justices on the larger issue, which is
whether the report itself was actually used substantively (even
though not introduced). The four-Justice dissent argued that the
Cellmark report had in effect been used as substantive evidence
in violation of the hearsay doctrine and (in their view) in violation of the Confrontation Clause, and the fact that the witness
had nothing to do with its preparation meant that the case was
controlled by Bullcoming.12
In Williams, investigators had obtained a vaginal swab from a
rape victim in Chicago. The Illinois State Police lab (ISP)
confirmed that there was semen on the swab, which was resealed
and sent to Cellmark in Maryland, which produced a DNA profile
and sent back its report. An ISP analyst then conducted a computer search of the ISP database and found a match with
defendant's DNA. (Williams is a “trawling” case, in which DNA is
the starting point, rather than the more usual case in which
other evidence leads to arrest, and DNA profiling confirms the
identity of defendant as the perpetrator.) In invoking expert
testimony rules, the plurality stressed that the case was tried to
a judge (who could be trusted to know the difference between
treating the Cellmark report as the basis of the expert's opinion
and taking it as substantive evidence). The plurality also
stressed, as a second theory supporting use of the Cellmark
report, that the “primary purpose” of the Cellmark test “was not
to accuse” the defendant or “create evidence for use at trial,” but
rather “to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large” (in
post-Williams decisions, other courts sometimes refer to the
“targeted accusation” factor).
Four others, including Justice Scalia (author of Crawford and
Melendez-Diaz), thought the procedure in Williams did violate
defense confrontation rights. The testifying analyst “affirmed,
without qualification, that the Cellmark report showed a ‘male
DNA profile found in semen taken from the vaginal swabs,’ ’’ and
12

Supreme Court: Williams v. Illinois, 132 S.Ct. 2221 (2012).
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the decisions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming mean that an
expert cannot “offer[ ] the results through the testimony of another analyst.” The swing vote (Justice Thomas) agreed with the
dissenters that “the validity” of the analyst's testimony “ultimately turned on the truth of Cellmark's statements,” hence that
the report was “admitted for its truth.” The only reason Thomas
aligned himself with the plurality who found no confrontation
violation is that he took the view that the Cellmark report was
not testimonial because it lacked “the solemnity of an affidavit or
deposition,” being “neither a sworn nor a certified declaration.”
Williams is a messy opinion that is hard to decipher.13 One
might construe it to mean that expert testimony, even when it
necessarily rests on a lab report that is testimonial in character,
may be admitted without providing an opportunity to crossexamine those who prepared the report. In favor of this construction, one can even cite Bullcoming, where Justice Sotomayor was
necessary to make a majority, and she wrote a separate concurring opinion stressing that the facts did not involve an expert giving “an independent opinion about underlying testimonial reports
that were not themselves admitted into evidence.”
This construction of Williams, however, does not stand up
under scrutiny, because five Justices agreed that the expert who
testified was making hearsay use of the underlying report—
rejecting the view that the report was just used to explain the
basis of her testimony, and necessarily the use of hearsay
implicates confrontation concerns. In short, five Justices thought
the Cellmark report was used substantively (only four thought
otherwise), and five thought it made no difference that the case
was tried to a judge, and five thought it made no difference that
the report was not accusatory (because nobody had been arrested), and only one Justice thought it was crucial that the report
was not sworn. In short, it seems that five Justices in Wil- liams
thought that what happened there triggered the right
established in Bullcoming to cross-examine the preparer, or at
least someone involved in the testing. Tellingly, Justice Sotomayor is one of the five in Williams who dissented, which suggests at the very least that her comment in Bullcoming cannot be
read to mean that experts may testify on the basis of testimonial
hearsay that is critical to their conclusion. In short, Williams is
better understood as a decision of limited impact that does not
excuse production of the preparer of such a report, that does not
13

California: See People v. Barba, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 707, 740 (Cal. App.
2013) (making sense of Williams and related cases is “to some extent an exercise
in tesseomancy” [fortunetelling]).
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exempt judge-tried cases from confrontation rights set out in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, and that does not exempt nonaccusatory statements from those confrontation rights either.14
Constitutional Standard: How broadly does it apply? MelendezDiaz settled the proposition that many forensic lab reports, prepared with a view to their use by the prosecutor in criminal trials, are testimonial statements. The decision expressly recognizes
that many such tests involve methods that require the exercise of
human judgment and bring risks of error. Hence such lab reports
are inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause unless the
defense has an adequate opportunity to cross-examine at some
point—at trial or before. What is not entirely clear is how broadly
this principle is to be applied. There is no room to doubt that the
principle applies to drug tests (Melendez-Diaz), blood alcohol
tests (Bullcoming), and DNA tests.
It seems that the Melendez-Diaz principle should reach reports
of all forensic tests, where they depend on modern science and
technology to develop conclusions in a setting in which it is
expected that they will be used in investigating or prosecuting
crime. Thus understood, the principle applies not only to the
three mentioned above, but also to ballistics tests, fingerprint
analysis, toolmark analysis, blood spatter analysis, and many
others.15
We should note that the plurality in Williams sought to narrow
14

Second Circuit: U.S. v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (when no
one rationale commands five Justices, holding is position taken by those who
concurred on narrowest ground; it is not “the plurality's narrowed definition of
testimonial,” and nor the view that lab reports are not testimonial because not
formal; Williams has no “single” holding useful here) (“routine autopsy report”
was not testimonial).
Wisconsin: State v. Deadwiller, 2013 WL 3612812 (Wis. 2013) (when “no
single rationale” explains result and commands five Justices, holding is position
of those who concurred in judgment on narrowest ground, but rule applies only
when two rationales for the majority “fit or nest into each other like Russian
dolls,” and a “fractured opinion mandates a specific result” if parties are in
substantial identical positions) (approving conviction on basis of testimony by
state lab technician that DNA profiles generated by Cellmark matched DNA in
state database).
15
District of Columbia: Gardner v. U.S., 999 A.2d 55, 59 (D.C. 2010) (DNA
and serology reports); Duvall v. U.S., 975 A.2d 839 (D.C. 2009) (drug lab report).
Massachusetts: Com. v. Hernandez, 929 N.E.2d 992, 996 (Mass. App.
2010) (drug certificate).
Mississippi: Burdette v. State, 110 So.3d 296, 304 (Miss. 2013) (ballistics
report) (admitting was harmless error).
New York: See People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019 (2008), cert. denied,
129 S.Ct. 2856 (2008) (fingerprint comparison report) (pre-Melendez-Diaz).
Oregon: State v. Willis, 236 P.3d 714 (Or. 2010) (drug analysis report).
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the coverage of the constitutional principle in the setting of forensic lab reports. In Bullcoming, the same four Justices dissented
and tried to shorten the reach of Crawford: They doubted that
“routine” reports raise constitutional issues, and in Williams they
pointed out that the lab report with the DNA profile was not a
“targeted accusation.” There is a kernel of truth in the proposition that a “routine” report does not raise confrontation concerns
as acutely and that “targeted accusations” suggest a mindset that
raises especially serious confrontation concerns. Decisions in
other courts stress similar points, approving use of reports in
part because of their routine nature16 or explaining that a report
could not be viewed as “pointing the finger” at anyone (or as an
“accusation” of someone, usually under suspicion for other
reasons).17 These points, however, hearken back to the Roberts
approach to confrontation issues, which stressed trustworthiness,
while the Crawford approach rests more on procedural or
adversarial considerations. It may be understandable from a human perspective why such points are made, but Crawford's basic
insight is that analyzing trustworthiness is not the mandate of
the confrontation clause, and in that sense these points should
not count. In Williams, four Justices would limit confrontation
concerns in this way, while five reject this argument.18
In large measure because of these uncertainties, courts disagree on the question whether autopsy reports are testimonial,
with some decisions concluding that they are,19 but some concluding otherwise on the basis that such reports have broader uses
than investigating or prosecuting crime.20
Constitutional Standard: Who Must Testify? Melendez-Diaz did
16

Second Circuit: U.S. v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 99 (2d Cir. 2013) (“routine
autopsy report” prepared by Office of Chief Medical Examiner before any criminal investigation began was not testimonial).
17
California: People v. Barba, 155 Cal. Rptr. 707, 742 (Cal. App. 2013)
(Cellmark DNA profile was nontestimonial; primary purpose was not “to accuse
a targeted individual,” even though defendant had been arrested).
18
Supreme Court: Williams v. Illinois, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2262 (2012) (decrying
“reformulated version” of “primary purpose” test endorsed by plurality; declarant can become a “witness” before identity of accused is known; there is no
textual justification for limiting confrontation concerns to “inherently inculpatory” statements) (dissenting opinion by Justice Kagan representing the views
of four Justices; Justice Thomas concurs on this point).
19
North Carolina: State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–305 (N.C. 2009)
(autopsy report was testimonial).
Oklahoma: Cuesta-Rodriguez v. State, 241 P.3d 214, 228 n8 (Okla. App.
2010) (autopsy report was testimonial).
20
Second Circuit: U.S. v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 99 (2d Cir. 2013) (“routine
autopsy report” was not testimonial).
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not describe or identify the witnesses that prosecutors are
expected to call in order to provide defendants, if they demand a
live witness, an adequate opportunity for cross-examination.
Clearly the technician who conducted the test is the best witness—or all technicians involved in conducting the test, and some
cases point toward this ideal as the actual requirement of
constitutional doctrine.21 At the opposite end of the spectrum, we
can be sure on the basis of Bullcoming that merely being a colleague working in the same lab with the analyst who conducted the
tests is not good enough to qualify the person to testify to the
substance of the report.22
In between these extremes is a range of possibilities. There are
good reasons to allow the presentation of a lab report by a technician or analyst who supervised the work of the person who ran
the actual tests, including those with overall supervisory authority over the activities of the lab. Such a witness should suffice if
she knows and can explain the testing process, has enough knowledge and training to understand the dangers and limits of the test
and the underlying machinery, and can read the notes and
Illinois: People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 590 (Ill. 2012) (autopsy report
was nontestimonial; not prepared for “primary purpose of accusing a targeted
individual” or for “primary purpose of providing evidence in a criminal case”).
21
District of Columbia: Gardner v. U.S., 999 A.2d 55, 61–62 (D.C. 2010) (error to let doctor C in Maryland lab testify on basis of DNA tests in Texas; C's
only involvement was “technical review” of file and report that was mailed to
her; error to let doctor Z testify on serology testing as “technical reviewer”)
(reversing).
Massachusetts: Com. v. Banville, 931 N.E.2d 457, 466 n3 (Mass. 2010) (in
murder trial, DNA testimony by state police chemist B that profiles she
developed were a “match” of those developed by another nontestifying chemist
“constitutes testimonial hearsay” as to the latter) (issue not preserved; error
harmless).
Nevada: Vega v. State, 236 P.3d 632, 636–637 (Nev. 2010) (in child sexual
abuse trial, error to let doctor testify to “observations, findings, and statements”
in sexual abuse examination report prepared by another doctor) (harmless).
22
D.C. Circuit: U.S. v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 70–73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (disapproving use of DEA drug analyses and autopsy report; testifying witness on
DNA report was forensic chemist who did not author or review report; testifying
witness on autopsy was chief medical examiner with limited connection to it).
North Carolina: State v. Craven, 696 S.E.2d 750, 752–753 (N.C. App.
2010) (in drug trial, error to present result of state crime report by technician who
played no part in testing) (reversing).
New Hampshire: State v. Connor, 937 A.2d 928 (N.H. 2007) (state crime
laboratory uses verification approach to fingerprint analysis, where second
technician independently analyzes, compares and evaluates data, and then first
technician generates report and issues opinion; letting first technician testify to
the work of second violated confrontation rights and hearsay doctrine)
(reversing).
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follow the steps described in the report and offer an informed
opinion that the test was (or was not) properly run and that the
results are (or are not) trustworthy. To be sure, such a witness
may not be in a position to know whether the samples were
handled or labeled right, whether the machinery used in the test
malfunctioned or operated properly, or whether the machinery
was properly calibrated or adjusted, but such a witness can shed
considerable and important light on the matter at hand. Most
courts approve testimony by such a witness,23 although some do
not.24
Also sufficient is a technician who performed critical parts of
23

Colorado: Marshall v. People, 2013 WL 3335095 (Colo. 2013) (in trial for
driving under influence of drugs, approving lab report on testimony by toxicology lab supervisor who supervised test and certified report) (dissent cites this
Treatise, arguing that technician who ran test is the only percipient witness).
Indiana: Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ind. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S.Ct. 3409 (as proof that defendant was father of victim's aborted
fetus, admitting DNA analysis on testimony by B as lab supervisor; B testified
about procedures, including receiving, storing, and testing, and reviewed table
and checked work of analyst P, who performed tests, sometimes relying on P's
notes).
Massachusetts: Com. v. Barbosa, 933 N.E.2d 93, 106–111 (Mass. 2010),
cert. denied, 2011 WL 1832850 (2011) (admitting testimony describing DNA test
results by senior criminalist in DNA unit of police department, who did not
perform tests but “supervised and trained the analyst” who did; Melendez-Diaz
“did not purport to alter the evidentiary rules governing expert testimony,” and
defendant had adequate opportunity to cross-examine on risks; she did “full
technical review”).
Mississippi: Galloway v. State, 2013 WL 2436653 (Miss. 2013) (admitting
DNA test results through testimony by analyst who was “technical reviewer” in
case, “familiar with each step,” and “personally analyzed” data and signed
report).
Virginia: Aguilar v. Com., 699 S.E.2d 215, 221–223 (2010), cert. denied,
131 S.Ct. 3089 (2011) (admitting DNA reports on testimony by person who
supervised work of technicians and was “directly involved in the entire DNA
analysis,” who was “the only person who could testify about the accuracy of the
DNA analysis, the standard operating procedures of the forensic laboratory, as
well as any deviations from or systemic problems”).
Washington: State v. Manion, 295 P.3d 270, 277 (Wash. App. 2013)
(admitting testimony reflecting DNA test on firearm; witness conducted “independent review” and was “significantly involved” in testing).
24
District of Columbia: Young v. U.S., 63 A.3d 1033 (D.C. 2013) (in trial for
kidnapping and rape, error to admit DNA match testimony based on report by
member of witness's staff) (reversing).
Nevada: Davidson v. State, 2013 WL 1458654 (Nev. 2013) (error to let
witness testify to DNA match on basis of certified report; witness did not actually develop DNA profile) (reversing).
Texas: Burch v. State, 401 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. App. 2013) (error to introduce
drug analysis through testimony by analyst's supervisor) (reversing).
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the analysis, even if such a technician did not participate in
every step of the laboratory process. Again the important point is
to call a witness with enough knowledge and training to
understand the dangers and limits of the test and the underlying
machinery, and who can understand and explain how the test
was performed and whether it was properly performed.25
Perhaps understandably the availability of witnesses sometimes carries some weight in deciding who must be called, but it
seems that this factor cannot excuse the obligation to call a
knowledgeable witness connected with the test at hand who can
answer critical questions about the process and the test itself.26
Constitutional Standard: Exceptions and Limitations. Justice
Sotomayor's concurrence in Bullcoming limits the impact of the
majority opinion in two ways not yet considered. First, she
stressed that there was no purpose for the blood alcohol report
other than law enforcement, suggesting that reports prepared for
“an alternate primary purpose,” such as treating a medical condition, would be a different matter. Second, she stressed that the
facts in Bullcoming did not involve “only machine-generated
results, such as a printout from a gas chromatograph.”
These qualifications on Bullcoming have taken on a life of their
own. Taking up the suggestion that laboratory reports are
nontestimonial when they serve an “alternate primary purpose,”
some decisions find even that DNA reports generated after the
defendant has been arrested are nontestimonial,27 and postWilliams authority approves the use of medical reports on crime
25

South Dakota: State v. Eagle, 2013 WL 4027130 (S.D. 2013) (approving
testimony by forensic DNA analyst on results of earlier tests performed in 2008,
and also tests that analyst herself ran in 2011 using a different method, where
witness had “participated in various steps of both the 2008 and the 2011 testing” and had “independently reviewed, analyzed, and compared the data”
obtained in the erlier test, and testified to “her own conclusions and statistical
calculations” and did not introduce the test reports though her testimony).
26
Maine: See State v. Mitchell, 4 A.3d 478, 489–490 (Me. 2010), cert. denied,
133 S.Ct. 55 (2012) (allowing chief medical examiner to testify on basis of
autopsy report by examiner who had left the country permanently).
Massachusetts: See Com. v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1028–1029 (Mass.
2009) (in murder trial, medical examiner could testify on basis of autopsy report
by a person no longer in state employ at time of trial).
27
California: People v. Barba, 155 Cal. Rptr. 707, 742 (Cal. App. 2013)
(Cellmark DNA profile was nontestimonial, either because it lacked testimonial
formalities or because “their primary purpose is not to accuse a targeted individual,” even though defendant had been arrested when report was sought).
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victims as nontestimonial where they appear to serve a medical
rather than prosecutorial purpose.28
Exempting from confrontation concerns machine-generated
output reflecting computerized testing processes can be understood as resting on the proposition that machine output is not
hearsay, which makes good sense in the case of simple machines
like clocks, and perhaps even in the case of elaborate computer
programs that are parts of almost everyone's life.29
Yet this view of machine-generated output does not take into
account some important points. First, the validity of the result
always turns on human actors, who must label and track samples
so the final output reflects what it purports to reflect (authentication issues). Second, often the validity of the result turns on
proper preparation and preservation of samples, and factors like
heat or even the simple passage of time can affect outcome. Third,
the output of most machines is so much “Greek” to most laymen,
and proper understanding and appraisal of the meaning of the
machine output almost always turns on understanding the nature
and limits (and pitfalls) of the process. Fourth, even machine
output does not always yield an answer, and instead produces
data that must be interpreted by humans on the basis of criteria
that are not hard-edged, foolproof, or even universally accepted.
Even if such material is to be exempted from confrontation
concerns, the proponent cannot be excused from offering suitable
foundation testimony, and often the most suitable testimony for
these purposes will require production of the analyst who
conducted the tests or was at least involved in the process or in
similar testing at the same lab.30
Constitutional Standard: Expert Testimony. As noted above,
28

Connecticut: State v. Anwar S, 61 A.3d 1129, 1137 (Conn. App. 2013) (in
sexual abuse trial, medical reports indicating that victim had sexually transmitted disease were nontestimonial; testing was done at clinic and lab, and tests
reported verbally by doctor; no indication that analysts were aware of law
enforcement involvement; test results did not bear indicia of formality).
29
See the discussion in § 8:13, supra.
30
Fourth Circuit: U.S. v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 201–204 (4th Cir. 2011)
(admitting expert testimony by lab supervisor S interpreting DNA tests
performed at his direction by others; S “painstakingly explained the process
whereby he, and he alone, evaluated the data to reach the conclusion that, to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty, [defendant] was the major contributor
of the DNA recovered from the jacket,” and the “numerical identifiers” on the
report prepared by others were nothing more than raw data produced by
machine).
U.S. v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 228–229 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
129 S.Ct. 2856 (2009) (in DUI trial, admitting testimony by lab director and
toxicologist based on gas chromatography and immunoassay tests using comput-

Hearsay

§ 8:91

Rule 803

the plurality opinion in Williams points toward the view that a
prosecution expert can testify on the basis of testimonial hearsay
without violating the confrontation clause.
Some modern opinions, both before and after the split decision in
Williams, have taken a similar course, approving expert
testimony based on such things as autopsy reports31 and other
ers with software producing 20 pages of data; toxicologist can rely on such
material).
Seventh Circuit: U.S. v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 812 (approving testimony by DEA chemist D based on
spectrometer and chromatograph; chemist O, who had left DEA, did original lab
work; D rested conclusion on report O prepared, and lab notes that persuaded D
that O prepared samples and ran tests correctly) (expert can rely on inadmis- sible
evidence).
California: People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 478 (Cal. 2012) (approving
printout of gas chromatograph measuring blood alcohol and concluding that
handwritten chain-of-custody data were nontestimonial too).
Florida: Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838 (Fla. 2009) (admitting DNA test
results on sample taken from defendant and semen sample found on victim's
clothing, through testimony by FBI supervisor, a forensic DNA examiner who
“interpreted the data, formulated the conclusions, and prepared the official
report” on basis of work done by biologists who did DNA tests; author of report
testified).
New York: People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 931–932 (N.Y. 2009) (DNA
report reflecting “machine-generated graphs, charts and numerical data,” prepared by private lab under contract to state was nontestimonial; there were “no
conclusions, interpretations or comparisons” in report since use of typing
machine would not entail subjective analysis; report could not be “tainted by a
pro-law-enforcement bias” as it was conducted before defendant was a suspect
and neither state agency nor private lab were law enforcement entities; witness
from agency testified that “technician incompetence” would not lead to accusations against defendant) (forensic biologist conducted analysis linking
defendant's DNA to profile found in victim's rape kit did testify).
31
First Circuit: Nardi v. Pepe, 662 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2011) (rejecting challenge to murder conviction where expert testified to cause of death on autopsy
report not in evidence; can rely on unadmitted reports).
California: People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 450 (Cal 2012) (approving forensic pathologist's testimony on “objective facts about the condition of the
victim's body” based on autopsy report and offering “independent opinion” that
victim died of strangulation; utility of autopsies is not limited to criminal
investigation; they serve other purposes, like helping figure out whether death
claim should be brought, and whether death is covered by insurance).
Illinois: People v. Lovejoy, 919 N.E.2d 843, 867–868 (Ill. 2009) (letting
doctor H testify that victim had lethal level of pseudoephedrine, on basis of
“toxicology testing done by someone else,” as doctor can rely on such material;
report itself was admitted only to show jury “the steps [H] took” to reach an
opinion).
Massachusetts: Com. v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1028–1029 (2009) (medical examiner could testify to cause of death on basis of autopsy report by an-
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relatively simple tests,32 and even DNA reports, as in Williams
itself.33 This approach should not be allowed to become an “end

other; expert can testify on basis of facts personally observed, evidence in record
or facts or independently admissible data that are permissible basis; autopsy
report is permissible basis; underlying facts would be admissible through
testimony) (error to admit autopsy itself, but harmless).
Maine: State v. Mitchell, 4 A.3d 478, 489–490 (Me. 2010), cert. denied,
133 S.Ct. 55 (2012) (chief medical examiner testified on basis of autopsy report
prepared by another; state did not offer report itself; testimony could prove
cause of death and identify defensive wounds).
32
Seventh Circuit: U.S. v. Maxwell, 2013 WL 3766519 (7th Cir. 2013)
(technician who did not conduct conduct labwork could testify, on basis of that
work, that substance was cocaine; expert can rely on inadmissible evidence;
report not offered; witness never said she relied on it or earlier analyst's
interpretatoin, she “reviewed the data” and reached “independent conclusion”)
(defendant did not object or deny that the substance was crack cocaine).
U.S. v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2010) (prosecutor could call B,
senior forensic chemist and head of drug identification unit of state lab, to
testify in place of H, chemist who analyzed substances taken from defendant; B
explained tests, described peer review process, saying he reviewed H's results;
B did not introduce H's actual statements, so there was “no problem” with B's
expert testimony).
South Carolina: State v. Ortiz-Zape, 743 S.E.2d 156 (N.C. 2013) (test
indicating cocaine; qualified expert may provide “independent opinion based on
otherwise inadmissible out-of-court statements; nontestifying analyst's machinegenerated test results were not admitted).
33
Arizona: State v. Gomez, 244 P.3d 1163, 1165–1166 (Ariz. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S.Ct. 2460 (2011) (admitting testimony by senior analyst and
supervisor of lab to which police submitted items from crime scene with sample
of defendant's blood; supervisor testified on basis of DNA profiles and checked
and described protocols; not clear that “machine-generated DNA profiles” are
hearsay, and profiles were not themselves proved; technicians who handle
samples and obtain machine-made data need not testify, “as long as someone
familiar with the profiles and laboratory procedures is subject to crossexamination”).
Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Greineder, 984 N.E.2d 804 (Mass. 2013)
(in murder trial, approving testimony by Cellmark analyst based on testing in her
laboratory by nontestifying analyst; it was error, but harmless, to let her testify
to test results on direct; she could give her expert opinion on basis of tests).
Wisconsin: State v. Deadwiller, 2013 WL 3612812 (Wis. 2013) (approving
conviction on basis of testimony by state lab technician that DNA profiles generated by Cellmark matched DNA in state database).
Tenth Circuit: U.S. v. Pablo, 696 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2012) (in sexual assault trial, admitting testimony by lab analyst S based on DNA report by analyst
B and serology report by analyst D; expert may give opinion resting on “inadmissible facts or data, which at times may include out-of-court testimonial statements,” and disclosure can sometimes help jury evaluate opinion; extent to
which testifying expert may disclose inadmissible testimonial hearsay is “a
question of degree”).
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run around” the confrontation concerns articulated so forcefully
in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. Expert testimony that depends
in critical part on out-of-court testimonial statements generated
in forensic lab work should not be admitted without calling a
percipient witness who can be actually examined and tested on the
substance of the underlying work.
There seems to be clear agreement in the cases that this exemption should not be used to offer expert testimony that simply
“parrots” testimonial hearsay, or that functions as a “conduit” for
hearsay.34 The Williams plurality took the view that experts can
rely on inadmissible hearsay (provided that it is reasonable to do
so), pointing out that the Rules often block the introduction of
inadmissible hearsay underlying expert opinion, and stressed
that Williams itself was a bench trial. But the other five Justices
in Williams were unpersuaded by those arguments, and were not
persuaded that expert reliance on inadmissible hearsay as a
crucial step in forming the opinion is permissible because it does
not violate the “conduit” limitation (Justice Kagan for the four
dissenters, and Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion). Expert
testimony that depends on out-of-court testimonial statements
should be viewed as violating defense confrontation rights, absent
a percipient witness knowledgeable and involved in the underlying tests, who can be cross-examined.35
Constitutional Standard: Authentication and Other Peripheral
Points. Replying to charges by dissenting Justices, the majority
34

Tenth Circuit: U.S. v. Pablo, 696 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2012) (recognizing
that expert who “simply parrots” another's hearsay is just a “backdoor conduit”).
Eleventh Circuit: U.S. v. Curbelo, 2013 WL 4038746 (10th Cir. 2013)
(confrontation concerns are not limited to “express hearsay statements,” and
prosecutors in Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz could not have admitted “numeric
or chemical results” without also offering “an analyst's certification” indicating
how he had reached those results).
Georgia: Rector v. State, 681 S.E.2d 157, 159–160 (Ga. 2009), cert. denied,
588 U.S. 1081 (state toxicologist could testify to toxicology report on deceased
victim prepared by another doctor; toxicologist reached same conclusion that
victim's blood sample tested negative for cocaine; witness did not act as mere
conduit, but reviewed data, presented conclusions based on other doctor's report).
35
District of Columbia: Young v. U.S., 63 A.3d 1033 (D.C. 2013) (error to
admit DNA match testimony based on report by member of witness's staff,
rejecting argument that she “did not quote” particular hearsay; she did relay
hearsay by relying “throughout her testimony” on testing by others) (reversing).
Massachusetts: Com. v. Banville, 931 N.E.2d 457, 466 n3 (Mass. 2010) (in
murder trial, DNA testimony by state police chemist that profiles she developed
were a “match” of those developed by nontestifying chemist “constitutes
testimonial hearsay” on the latter) (issue not preserved, and any error harmless).
New Hampshire: State v. Connor, 937 A.2d 928 (N.H. 2007) (state crime
lab uses verification approach to fingerprints, where second technician indepen-
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in Melendez-Diaz emphatically denied that everyone whose
testimony might be relevant to show “chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device” must appear
and testify.36 Justice Breyer took the position in Williams that
the case needed to be reargued, and he expressed discomfort in a
doctrine that requires production of live witnesses without requiring production of all witnesses whose involvement in lab testing
might be critical to the outcome (he saw “no logical stopping
place” between requiring the prosecutor to call “one of the laboratory experts” and requiring the prosecutor to call “all” of them),
and it seems true that even an error on what seems a minor and
ministerial step could radically affect outcome.37 Indeed, the dissenters in Williams cited an example of a case that produced a
seeming match between the accused and the perpetrator until
the testifying witness recognized at the last minute that the
crime scene sample had been compared to the victim's sample, not
the defendant's, so the match proved nothing in the case.38
Maybe the best that can be said for the compromise endorsed
in Melendez-Diaz is that we must avoid making the best the
enemy of the good. It is better to take some risks that the process
will miscarry—hopefully rarely—than effectively to reject proof
that is likely to be more reliable and persuasive than other kinds
of circumstantial evidence, and even eyewitness testimony. At
least sometimes the consequence of ministerial slipups can be
caught in other ways because the data will not make sense. The
plurality advanced this argument in Williams, claiming that
mistakes in handling the crime scene sample could not have occurred because of the match found with defendant's DNA, and
that contamination would have showed up in the test results.39 In
any event, it seems that the constitutional standard does not
require production of every witness who handled a testing
dently analyzes data; Rule 703 does not pave way for first analyst to testify to
work of second; and first analyst simply parroted work of second) (reversing).
36
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n1 (2009).
37
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2247 (2012) (wondering how many
witnesses prosecutor should call; each one of six to twelve technicians might say
something critical; while we may need “some kind of limitation” on applying
Crawford, we don't now have an answer) (Breyer concurrence).
38
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012) (concluding that
confrontation is the mechanism that our Constitution provides for “catching
such errors”) (Kagan and three others in dissent).
39
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2237, 2244 (2012) (asserting that
there is “no plausible explanation” for the match with defendant's DNA if
Cellmark had tested “any sample other than the one” taken from her; also stating that “defects in a DNA profile may often be detected from the profile itself,”
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sample, nor those who calibrate the machinery used in the
process.40
Constitutional Standard Generalized Data. It seems that general statistical data, which are collected for such purposes as assessing the frequency of genetic markers in the population or
tracing phonecalls or internet “hits,” are nontestimonial if the
data in question are gathered for generalized law enforcement or
regulatory purposes, in efforts that are not undertaken with any
particular criminal investigation or prosecution in mind.41 The
same conclusion seems warranted where tests are run completely
outside the investigative context, as may happen if they are
conducted before the alleged crime even occurred.42
Hearsay Issues. Almost lost in the shu˘e of constitutional isand witness testified that “she would have been able to tell from the profile” if
the sample had degraded).
40
Arizona: Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 471, 475 (Ariz. App. 2006)
(maintenance and calibration records for breath-testing machine).
Kentucky: Com. v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570 (Ky. 2006) (certificate reflecting maintenance and tests of intoxilyzer machine).
Maine: State v. Ducasse, 8 A.3d 1252 (Me. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct.
3091 (2011) (certificate of compliance prepared by manufacturer of blood alcohol
kit to prove that equipment did not contain material that would disturb integrity of blood sample; certificate addressed manufacturing specifications).
Mississippi: Deeds v. State, 27 So.3d 1135 (Miss. 2009) (in DUI trial,
admitting blood alcohol test results despite claim that state failed to preserve
chain of custody by not saying who drew blood; can rely on testimony by officer
G, who saw attending nurse draw blood and label sample).
New York: People v. Pealer, 985 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 2013) (records on routine inspection, maintenance, and calibration of breathalyzer).
North Carolina: State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 144 (N.C. 2006), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 1021 (state bureau report on chain of custody of DNA material).
Texas: Settlemire v. State, 323 S.W.3d 520, 521–522 (Tex. App. 2010)
(“intoxilyzer maintenance records”).
West Virginia: State v. Dilliner, 569 S.E.2d 211, 215 (W.Va. 2002) (inspection report on accuracy of intoxilyzer).
41
Eighth Circuit: U.S. v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1124–1125 (8th Cir. 1977)
(printouts on drugs seized across country, including lab analyses).
Kansas: State v. Appleby, 221 P.3d 525, 552 (Kan. 2009) (lab analyst
provided “data” upon which she relied “in reaching her opinion regarding
population frequency of specific DNA profiles,” which material was not
testimonial; writing computer programs allowing comparison of samples “are
nontestimonial actions,” and “neither the database nor the statistical program
are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony”) (only expert's opinion is
testimonial).
42
Iowa: State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 753–57 (Iowa 2006) (in trial for
criminal transmission of disease, lab reports showing that defendant was HIV
positive were nontestimonial; they had been ordered and prepared by medical
clinic two years before alleged crime).
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sues is the question whether forensic lab reports fit one or more
exceptions to the hearsay doctrine. Yet hearsay issues are
important, as the rule against hearsay evidence rests on judgments relating to trustworthiness and necessity that are independent of constitutional values. The shift from the Roberts approach to Crawford, which severed the constitutional inquiry
from trustworthiness considerations and focused instead exclusively on the question whether statements are testimonial, makes
it all the more important to apply faithfully the criteria of the
hearsay exceptions, even when constitutional concerns have been
dealt with.43
The right exception to apply in this circumstance is the public
records exception in Rule 803(8), often cited as Fed. R. Evid.
803(8). For reasons that require some explanation, the public records exception does not allow use of forensic lab reports against
criminal defendants. Equally important, the use restrictions in
that exception, in the best understanding of their meaning, lead
to the conclusion that the only available exception for lab reports
is the one for past recollection recorded, which has its own
requirements that should be satisfied before such reports are
admitted, which of course includes calling as a witness the lab
technician who prepared the report as a witness. The exception for
past recollection recorded is found in Rule 803(5), often cited as
Fed. R. Evid. 803(5). The decision in the Oates case44 addressed use
of Rule 803(8) in this setting (the case involved a Customs Service
laboratory analysis of white powder, which concluded that the
powder was cocaine). Oates addressed four major hearsay issues:
First, forensic lab reports, whether prepared in official laboratories (state or federal crime labs) or in private laboratories by
arrangement with prosecuting authorities, ought to be viewed as
public records. Arrangements between law enforcement or
prosecutors and private labs makes the latter into what amounts
to state or government agencies, and private labs assisting in
investigating or prosecuting crime take on the mindset or orienta43

Seventh Circuit: U.S. v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2010) (calling investigating officer “might seem to cure any objection to the introduction
into evidence of the records of that case” because he became cross-examinable, but
use restrictions in Rule 803(8) reflect deeper concern that “reports by law
enforcers are less reliable than reports by other public officials because of law
enforcers' adversary relation to a defendant”).
44
Second Circuit: U.S. v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 77 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussed in
§ 8:90, supra).

Hearsay

§ 8:91

Rule 803

tion of their employers and cannot reasonably be viewed as
independent.45
Second, hearsay issues relating to forensic lab reports should
be addressed by applying Rule 803(8). Most other exceptions
should not be used for this purpose, particularly the business records exception and the catchall. The reason is that if the restrictions in Rule 803(8) can be gotten around by resorting to an
exception that does not have such restrictions, then their purpose
is not well served. Resort to the business records exception is
particularly problematic, as its requirements are often satisfied
with respect to lab reports, and yet that exception lacks the
safeguards built into Rule 803(8)(A)(ii) and (A)(iii). Resort to the
catchall seems inadequate because analyzing trustworthiness is
a particularly difficult task when it comes to lab reports on account of motivational factors and many others. Equally important,
even private laboratories are not really private when they act
under contract with law enforcement or prosecutors, as such arrangements make them part of the investigative and prosecutorial effort, and they too should be treated as public agencies,
which again points away from applying the business records
exception. In the end, then, in the absence of a special statute
such as many states have enacted, hearsay issues should usually
be resolved under the public records exception.46 We note here
that some courts continue to reject this conclusion.47
Third, even laboratory technicians should be viewed as part of
45

Supreme Court: See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 n2 (2006)
(911 operators may not be law enforcement, but they are “agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911 callers,” and Court considers
them law enforcement for purposes of for purposes of confrontation analysis).
46
Fifth Circuit: U.S. v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380, 381–382 (5th Cir. 1980) (error
to use business records exception for escape report by federal prison; exception
“does not open a back door” for evidence barred by use restriction) (reversing).
Idaho: State v. Sandoval-Tena, 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (Idaho 2033) (effect of
restrictions in Rule 803(8) would be “meaningless” if a report were admissible
under business records exception) (citing Oates).
Maine: See State v. Tomah, 736 A.2d 1047 (Me. 1999) (excluding forensic
report on blood spatter patterns, offered by defense; forensic expert reports are
“the antitheses of the business records” in Rule 803(6); they are “advocacy
reports, expressly prepared for litigation to support one party,” and preparation
is not routine, nor is the record “the type that is contemplated by” Rule 803(6)).
Texas: Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798, 810 (Tex. App. 1990) (documents
inadmissible under second clause of 803(8) “may not be admitted under Rule
803(6),” meaning that the business records exception cannot be used as a “back
door” for evidence inadmissible under the second clause).
47
Second Circuit: U.S. v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1238 (2007) (admitting autopsy reports, which fit business records
exception even though also being public records) (not testimonial).
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law enforcement, regardless whether they work in state or
government crime laboratories or in private laboratories under
contract with the state or federal government. Even though the
work of such technicians does not entail carrying a gun,
interviewing witnesses, or making arrests, such persons are still
part of law enforcement for the reason suggested in Oates, which
is that such a person is part of the prosecutorial and investigative team.48
Fourth, forensic lab reports could fit clause (A)(ii) or (A)(iii),
but the latter is the better fit. Clause (A)(ii) covers a “matter
observed,” and one might argue that drug analyses or DNA
profiles do reflect matters “observed” by those who do the tests
and write up the results, but the language in this clause was
clearly designed for the more mundane observations that are
made when an investigating officer writes up a description of an
accident or a crime scene—nontechnical descriptive material summing up observations by public officials in the exercise of their
responsibilities, not scientific inquiries performed in laboratories
with sophisticated equipment. Clause (A)(iii) covers “factual findings” from “a legally authorized investigation,” which is much
closer in apparent meaning to the activities of a crime lab in carrying out scientific tests.
Regardless which clause applies, there are problems. Applying
clause (A)(ii) leads to the conclusion that the prosecutor cannot
introduce lab reports unless analysts can somehow be viewed as
not being law enforcement personnel or the reports are viewed as
“routine and nonadversarial,” thus fitting a court-made exception
to the restriction in that clause. Decisions analyzing such reports
under the confrontation clause occasionally stress factors that
could lead to applying this judge-made exception in clause
(A)(ii)—that indeed some lab reports are “routine,” at least in relation to some of their content, in two senses: First, they are part
of the everyday activities of the analyst that involve following
Seventh Circuit: U.S. v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006) (approving
hospital lab reports showing illegal drug use; invoking business records exception; tests were made in “ordinary course,” although requested after defendant's
arrest).
U.S. v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 670–672 (7th Cir. 1993) (invoking catchall exception for lensometer test results by private lab at FBI request; fact that
test was produced for prosecution barred resort to business records exception;
fact that findings were made by private lab foreclosed resort to public records
exception).
48
Michigan: See People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610, 618 n7 (Mich. App.
2005) (report by analyst working for police crime lab was by nature “adversarial,”
so it was not admissible under public or business records exceptions).
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procedural steps that are more-or-less set in stone and apply
across the board. Second, at least sometimes some parts of such
reports are not “targeted” toward any particular person, and the
setting in which the technician worked does not suggest that any
one conclusion would be more useful than another.49 Applying
clause (A)(iii) is similarly problematic because the use restriction
is so absolute—material within this provision is admissible in
civil cases and “against the government” in criminal cases.
These arguments for admitting lab reports stretch the exception and minimize the concerns underlying the use restrictions,
and often the arguments simply strain credulity. It seldom happens that analysts are clueless about the direction or significance
of their findings: Persons asked to test baggies of white powder
know that they are likely to discover a banned substance, and
persons asked to compare two DNA samples are likely to know
that investigators think there may be a match, and that in all
likelihood finding a match advances an investigation already
ongoing. The very fact that a prosecutor or law enforcement
agency seeks an answer, coupled with even a little guesswork or
information about the case, tells technical people what answer is
expected (perhaps preferred) and how it “cuts” in an investigation or a pending prosecution.
As noted above, the one provision available in federal courts in
this setting is the exception for recollection recorded in Rule
803(5). While the use restrictions in Rule 803(8)(A)(ii) and
803(8)(A)(iii) should block resort to the business and catchall
exceptions, it is appropriate to allow use of the exception for past
recollection, which has the virtue of producing a live percipient
witness who can be cross-examined and who is likely to have
considerable knowledge about the testing process and enough
recollection to shed some light on the reliability of the record in
question. This avenue does not reach the situation in which a
supervising analyst takes the stand, which satisfies confrontation
concerns in many decisions cited in this section, but it does pave
the way to use lab reports where the preparer himself is on the
stand.50 Of course state courts, even in states that have adopted
the Rules, generally have available “notice-and-demand” statutes
that generally make the reports themselves admissible, although
49

Second Circuit: U.S. v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (admitting
autopsy report by Office of Chief Medical Examiner and stressing that it's “routine” nature made it non testimonial).
50
Oregon: See State v. Rumler, 110 P.3d 115 (Or. App. 2005) (approving
use of intoxilyzer report as past recollection recorded; rejecting challenge under
confrontation clause).

the “demand” feature enables defendants to require prosecutors to
produce percipient witnesses as well.
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